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A Directors’ Duties Perspective
by
Irit Mevorach*
Some systems have more efficient legal frameworks for insolvency than other regimes, thus
directors of troubled companies may seek opportunities abroad. Yet, the legitimacy of forum
shopping in close proximity to insolvency is debatable in the context of cross-border insolvency
regimes. This paper examines the forum shopping phenomenon from a new perspective, that
of directors’ duties in times of financial trouble, specifically in light of emerging international
standards in this area. This method allows unearthing the degree to which forum shopping is
legitimate. This paper also shows how the directors’ duties regime is better fit to deal with
illegitimate forum shopping compared with cross-border insolvency frameworks.
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I. Introduction
Forum shopping by corporations in close proximity to insolvency is a subject
of heated debate.1 In particular, cross-border insolvency regimes, which are
aimed at harmonising the private international law aspects of insolvency, have
struggled to deal with this problem effectively. The controversy has become
especially acute in recent years in view of a perceived increase in corporate
relocations prior to corporations’ insolvency. Examples include relocations to
the UK of Hellas Telecommunications, European Directories, and Gallery
Capital before the companies instituted insolvency proceedings.2 Indeed, the
UK in particular has established itself as a popular venue for the restructuring
of failing enterprises, apparently because of the attractive features of the com-
pany voluntary arrangement procedures and pre-pack administrations.3 How-
ever, debtor forum shopping in close proximity to insolvency is not confined
to movements into the UK.4
The paper considers the forum shopping phenomenon from the perspective of
directors’ duties in the period approaching insolvency.5 Indeed, the regulation
of management duties in terms of their trading decisions during the time
leading up to insolvency and the legitimacy of debtor forum shopping tend
to be considered as two separate issues and have been the subject of distinct
initiatives and debates.6 However, both issues relate to managerial pre-crisis
1 The article focuses on eve of insolvency corporate forum shopping which involves a
relocation of the company. This should be contrasted with forum shopping by manipu-
lating or misrepresenting facts related to the company’s location (which does not in fact
involve a relocation; see further on this scenario n 118–122 and accompanying texts), and
forum shopping after the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Corporate forum
shopping in the ordinary course of business and forum shopping in civil litigation are also
beyond the scope of this article.
2 Re European Directories (DH6) BV [2010] EWHC 3472 (Ch); Re Hellas Telecommuni-
cations (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC3199 (Ch) [2010] BCC295;GalleryCapital
S.A v In the Matter of Gallery Media Group Ltd (2010) WL 4777509.
3 See e.g. the Da Movo, IMO car wash and Wind Hellas enterprises that migrated to the
UK in order to take advantage of the pre-pack strategy. See alsoHEidenmüller, ‘Abuse of
law in the context of European insolvency law’ (2009) 6 European Company and Finan-
cial Law Review 1, 5.
4 See e.g. the case of PIN Group SA (Amtsgericht Köln, 19 February) (73 IE 1-08).
5 ‘Director’ for the purpose of this paper means anyone who plays a role in the company’s
management either formally (de jure directors) or informally (de facto directors), or
through controlling the managers or giving them instructions (often referred to as
‘shadow directors’, see e.g. English Insolvency Act, s 214(7) and 251) (hereinafter: direc-
tors or managers).
6 See on the one hand, initiatives in Europe regarding directors’ duties in the context of the
EU harmonization programme (Report of the High Level Group of Company Law
Experts of 4 November 2002, Ch. III; Study on Directors’ Duties and Liability (April
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decisions and therefore raise similar risks. In particular, the possibility that
directors will act in a self-serving manner in the time leading up to insolvency
or make decisions harmful to creditors is relevant to both trading and reloca-
tion decisions (to the extent that directors anticipate opportunities abroad).
There is, therefore, sense in controlling both of these aspects of decision-
making in a consistent manner, and in attempting to reconcile the approach
to forum shopping under cross-border insolvency frameworks with what is
generally expected from directors when the company is in financial crisis. This
is especially the case since international standards regarding directors’ obliga-
tions in the period approaching insolvency are emerging, as a result of the
work undertaken by UNCITRAL.7 That is, what is expected of directors at
the time leading up to insolvency is becoming an international matter. In fact,
the decision of UNITRAL to standardise the rules regarding directors’ duties
was driven by the reality of globalized insolvencies and the need to control
managers’ behaviour on a worldwide basis and achieve consistent solutions.8
The fact that an international regime is emerging in this area also suggests that
there is scope for controlling problems of mismanagement on a worldwide
basis, to the extent that national regimes would comply with the new bench-
marks. Indeed, the paper will also argue that the new directors’ duties regime is
a more adequate tool for dealing with problems related to the forum shopping
practice, than cross-border insolvency frameworks would be. Thus, the paper
aims both to contribute to the debate regarding the legitimate ambit of forum
shopping and to point to an alternative measure that could address detrimental
forum shopping. The conclusions could also shed light on the efficacy of
current reform initiatives concerning the main cross-border insolvency frame-
works.9
The paper begins (in Part II) by delineating the scope of the forum shopping
debate in the context of cross-border insolvency frameworks and the impli-
cations of the forum shopping controversy on the prominence of the cross-
2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/board/) and similar initiatives of
UNCITRAL in the context of harmonization of insolvency laws (United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law 2004 (hereafter: the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide), para 34; new recommenda-
tions on directors’ duties that will be added to the Legislative Guide, discussed in Part III
of the paper). Cf. the reform of cross-border insolvency frameworks and the discussion
of forum shopping in this context (discussed in Part II of the paper).
7 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. See further part III below.
8 See Part III below.
9 The European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings is undergoing revision (the redraft-
ing process is likely to end during 2014). Working Group Vof UNCITRAL has recently
revised the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border In-
solvency. These frameworks are discussed in Part II of the paper.
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border insolvency regimes. Subsequently (in Part III), the paper examines the
emerging benchmarks in the area of directors’ duties during the period ap-
proaching insolvency and the underlying rationale for these benchmarks. Part
IV examines what these new benchmarks reveal with regard to the forum
shopping debate and the extent to which the directors’ duties regime could
play an effective role in addressing problems of forum shopping. Part V dis-
cusses possible obstacles to the uniform adoption of the international bench-
marks. Part VI concludes.
II. Forum Shopping – Casting a Shadow on the Efficacy of
Cross-Border Insolveny Frameworks
The field of cross-border insolvency has developed quite rapidly in recent
years. From a state of almost total chaos resulting from the application of
conflicting domestic private international laws, it is gradually becoming an
area regulated by uniform frameworks.10 The EU Regulation governs cross-
border insolvencies within Europe.11 The UNCITRAL Model Law12 is the
main global framework for cross-border insolvency. It applies to any country
that opts to adopt it,13 while creditors and office-holders from any other
country may also invoke the Model Law in the adopting States.
These frameworks support the centralization of insolvency proceedings in the
company’s home country, which is its centre of main interests (COMI), i.e. its
real economic centre, presumed to be located at its registered office.14 Thus,
the EU Regulation provides that only the country in which the COMI is
located can open the main proceedings against the debtor.15 The Model Law
too requires that proceedings will be recognized as main proceedings only if
they were opened in the jurisdiction in which the COMI is located, and only
one suchmain proceedingmay be recognized.16 The COMI forumwould then
ideally be in a position to administer the process collectively, under the same
set of laws, overseeing the complete affairs of the company and including all
10 See generally IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (Oxford 2005).
11 European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (Council Regulation 1346/2000)
(hereafter: EU Regulation), which applies whenever the centre of main interests of
the debtor is located in a Member State, except Denmark which has not participated
in the adoption of the Regulation.
12 UnitedNations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Sales No.
E.99.V.3 (hereafter: the UNCITRAL Model Law or Model Law).
13 Thus far 20 countries have adopted the Model Law.
14 The EU Regulation, art. 3(1).
15 Ibid.
16 Model Law, arts. 2(b) and 16(3) and 17(2)(a).
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creditors in the process. Indeed, subject to a public policy exception, the EU
Regulation requires that other Member States would automatically recognize
the opening ofmain proceedings, without reviewing the decision regarding the
location of the COMI.17 Under theModel Law, the foreign office-holder must
seek recognition of the foreign proceedings as the main proceedings.18 How-
ever, (and again subject to a similar public policy exception19) recognition
should be granted swiftly if the court finds that the COMI is present in the
foreign jurisdiction.20 Under both regimes, though, it is possible that addi-
tional proceedings will be opened in other countries. The EU Regulation
allows the opening of secondary proceedings if the debtor company has an
established presence in another Member State.21 Under the Model Law, the
court may recognize other foreign proceedings as non-main proceedings (in
addition to recognizing the main proceedings in the COMI jurisdiction).22 It
may also open local proceedings after the recognition of themain proceedings,
if there are assets in the jurisdiction.23 However, both regimes require coop-
eration among the multiple proceedings concerning the same debtor.24 The
extent of the global perspective of the main proceedings under theModel Law
will also depend on the type of relief that the recognizing court would grant
with regard to the foreign proceedings, as only some relief is automatic,25
while the rest is discretionary.26 Furthermore, theModel Law does not provide
choice-of-law rules and therefore deference to the laws of the forum would
depend on receiving relief to this extent from the recognizing court. Under the
EU Regulation, on the other hand, the opening of the main proceeding has
automatic EU-wide effect and the office-holder appointed in the main pro-
ceedings may exercise all the powers conferred on him by the law of the State
where proceedings were opened.27 Indeed, the law of the forum (of the main
proceedings) would apply to most insolvency matters arising in the course of
the proceedings.28 Thus, although there are notable differences between the
17 The EU Regulation, art. 16 and 26.
18 Model Law, art. 15. Indeed, multiple main proceedings may be opened anywhere in the
world, but the recognizing court can recognize only one set of main proceedings under
the Model Law’s scheme.
19 Model Law, art. 6.
20 Model Law, arts. 15–17.
21 EU Regulation, art.3(2).
22 Model Law, arts. 2(c) and 17(2)(b)).
23 Model Law, art. 28.
24 EU Regulation, art. 31 (cooperation between liquidators in main and secondary pro-
ceedings). Model Law, art. 25–27 (cooperation between courts and insolvency repre-
sentatives in the enacting States and the foreign jurisdiction).
25 Importantly, the stay of proceedings (Model Law, art. 20).
26 Model Law, art. 21.
27 EU Regulation, art. 18.
28 EU Regulation, art. 4. This is subject to a list of exceptions (arts. 5–15).
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models and notwithstanding mechanisms enshrined in the models for opening
multiple proceedings or ways to deny recognition, both regimes are premised
on an international (universalist) approach, which seeks to promote a global
universal perspective over international insolvencies, primarily via the juris-
diction of the debtor’s economic centre.29
One notable struggle with regard to the formulation and operation of these
regimes, though, has been how to tackle forum shopping, specifically the
relocation of the COMI at the time approaching insolvency. There has clearly
been a desire to address the issue within the cross-border insolvency frame-
works, yet it has been difficult to develop practical solutions, which are also
justified by a coherent rationale. The EU Regulation has explicitly de-
nounced the practice of moving assets or proceedings with the motive of
improving the company’s legal position.30 Yet, it did not provide explicit
means to address forum shopping within the body of the Regulation. The
European Commission proposes to retain the same approach of “forum
shopping avoidance” (in the forthcoming revised Regulation), but to refer
more specifically to forum shopping that is detrimental to the general body of
creditors.31 The proposals also seek to minimise the problem of forum shop-
ping by requiring courts to examine their jurisdiction ex officio and by grant-
ing all foreign creditors a right to challenge the opening decision.32 The
Model Law does not mention the issue of forum shopping within its provi-
sions. However, the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law was recently
revised,33 and it is now suggested that courts should carefully scrutinize the
debtor’s circumstances where the COMI was moved shortly before the com-
29 See generally JLWestbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98
Mich L Rev 2276.
30 The EU Regulation, Preamble, Recital 4.
31 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Council Regulation (EC)No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceed-
ings, 12. 12. 2012 COM(2012) 744 final (hereafter: European Commission Proposal),
proposed amendment to recital 4.
32 Ibid, proposed new article 3 b.
33 See UNCITRALWorking Group V (Insolvency Law), Forty-third session, New York,
15–19 April, 2013 ‘Interpretation and application of selected concepts of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency relating to centre of main interests
(COMI)‘, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112; hereafter: UNCITRAL WP.112, and A/CN.9/
766, Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the work of its forty-third
session (New-York, 15–19 April 2013); hereafter: Report, forty-third session). The final
text of the revised Guide to Enactment would be available in due course on the UN-
CITRALwebsite (http://www.uncitral.org). The author had the privilege of participat-
ing in the deliberations as adviser to the United Kingdom delegation. All views ex-
pressed here, though, are solely those of the author.
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mencement of the proceedings.34 It is noted in working papers in this respect
that there may be instances where the move was designed to thwart the
legitimate expectations of creditors and third parties or was undertaken as
the result of insider exploitation or biased motivation.35
Courts applying the cross-border insolvency frameworks have also struggled
with the problem of forum shopping. Examining the case law reveals a some-
what undecided approach, which is understandable in the absence of a clear
notion of the ambit of acceptable forum shopping and in view of the difficul-
ties of evaluating reasons andmotivations for relocation. Thus, in some cases it
is apparent that courts regard corporate relocations prior to the institution of
insolvency proceedings with suspicion and resentment,36 while in other cases
they tend to focus on whether the COMI is actually located in the (new)
jurisdiction without any further investigation.37 The Court of Justice of the
European Union (ECJ) provided some clarification in the Interedil case,38
where it accepted that the registered office of the company might move from
one jurisdiction to another and noted that the most recent location is what
counts. It also did not express any concern with regard to forum shopping and
did not suggest that it might be a harmful or an illegitimate practice. However,
in this case, the relocation took place long before the commencement of the
proceedings. It was not a case of forum shopping in close proximity to the
insolvency proceedings.39
The problem of forum shopping has also been a major source of continuous
attack on the efficacy of cross-border insolvency frameworks. Generally, the
idea of centralizing proceedings in the home country of the corporate debtor
has been subject to academic criticism, largely because of the alleged instabil-
ity, unpredictability, and risk of abusive relocation of any identified corporate
centre. “Territorialists”, who have advocated the split of insolvency proceed-
34 The Working Group has also clarified that the location of the COMI should be deter-
mined with reference to the time when the foreign proceeding was commenced
(WP.112, para 128C). Cf. Fairfield Sentry Ltd 11-4376 (2nd Cir. 2013).
35 See WP.112, para 123K.
36 See Shierson v Vlieland-Boddy [2005] 1 WLR 3985 and Official Receiver v Eichler
[2007] BPIR 1636,HCJ;Die Sparkasse BremenAGvArmutcu (2012) ChD (concerning
individuals); Ci4net.com Inc [2005] BCC 277 (Ch D); TXU Europe German Finance
BV, Re, [2005] BCC 90 (ChD). In the context of theModel Law see Fairfield Sentry Ltd
11-4376 (2nd Cir. 2013) where the court noted that there may be room in relevant cases
to consider COMI manipulations in bad faith between the date of commencement of
the proceedings and the date of the application for recognition.
37 See e.g. Re European Directories (DH6) BV [2010] EWHC 3472 (Ch); Re Hellas Tele-
communications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch) [2010] BCC 295.
38 Interedil Srl (Case C-396/09) [2011] ECR.
39 Ibid paras 10–11.
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ings among the countries where the company’s assets are located, have argued
that it is too difficult to locate the home country of a debtor company, espe-
cially in cases of large enterprises operating as corporate groups.40 Even if
some test for identifying the home country were provided (be it the place of
incorporation, assets, or the location of the head office of a company), multi-
national companies would always be able to manipulate the forum. To an
extent, the locations of assets and operations are more difficult to change (so
the argument goes), but even these can be moved.41 Multinational groups have
even greater opportunities for shifting their centres, as they can achieve the
change through acquisitions and divestitures.42 Specifically, it has been claimed
that using the COMI test as the solution for the home country conundrum
cannot control the problem of forum shopping. The COMI is argued to be a
‘movable feast’.43 The test is too fuzzy, vague, and prone to manipulation since
the determination of the location of the real economic centre is very fact
sensitive.44
It has been argued further that relocation of the prospective insolvency fo-
rum may be detrimental to creditors. Thus, directors may act self-servingly,
seeking to move to legal regimes that are favourable to them while escaping
liabilities, or may move exclusively in order to harm a particular group of
creditors.45 Although it has been acknowledged that relocation of the
COMI may actually benefit creditors in certain circumstances,46 it has been
difficult to point to the dividing line between good and bad forum shop-
40 See LM LoPucki ‘Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Ap-
proach’ (1999) 84 Cornell L Rev 696, 716–25; LM LoPucki, ‘Universalism Unravels’
[2005] 79 Am Bankr L J 143, 152–58. Indeed, currently, the cross-border insolvency
frameworks do not address the case of the corporate group and do not suggest a jurisdic-
tional test in this context (see generally I Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational
Enterprise Groups (Oxford University Press, 2009).
41 LM LoPukci, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the
Bankruptcy Courts (Ann Arbor 2005) 229.
42 Ibid.
43 See G McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency
Proceedings’ (2009) CLJ 169, 196.
44 See e.g. H Eidenmüller, ‘Free Choice in International Company Insolvency Law in
Europe’ (2005) 6 EBOR 423, 428 and 430-31; DA Skeel, ‘European Implication of
Bankruptcy Venue Shopping in the US’ (2007) 54 Buff L Rev 439, 463; WG Ringe,
‘Forum shopping under the EU InsolvencyRegulation’ (2008) EBOR 580, 612; P Torre-
mans, ‘Coming to Terms with the COMI Concept in the European Insolvency Regu-
lation’ in P.J. Omar (ed), International Insolvency LawThemes and Perspectives (Alder-
shot, 2008) 173, 181; McCormack, Jurisdictional Competition (n 43) 196.
45 See e.g. Eidenmüller, Abuse (n 3) 11.
46 See G Moss, IF Fletcher and S Isaacs, The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings
(Oxford 2009) 262; Eidenmüller, Abuse (n 3) 11.
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ping.47 Specifically, it has been noted that whether or not there has been abuse
may be difficult to judge,48 and that relocation may be good for some cred-
itors but not for others.49 Some have suggested that forum shopping is not
abusive if all creditors have consented to the move.50 Others have suggested
that the test should be whether there was an actual increase in the net assets of
the company following the migration (in which case forum shopping would
not be deemed abusive),51 or whether or not the relocation was fraudulent.52
In this light, it may well be the case that even with the forthcoming clarifica-
tion in the cross-border insolvency regimes that illegitimate forum shopping
would be confined to relocation that is detrimental to the general body of
creditors, there would be uncertainty regarding the ambit of legitimate forum
shopping. Specifically, questions could arise regarding the actual meaning of
detrimental forum shopping and the basis for establishing detriment in this
context. Would the company be required to prove that the relocation took
place with the consent of all or most creditors? Alternatively, would it need to
show that the relocation resulted in an increase of the net assets? To what
extent should courts be engaged in investigating the circumstances of insider
exploitation or biased motivation pertaining to relocation when considering
applications for recognition of foreign proceedings, especially in view of the
requirement that recognition applications should be decided upon at the ear-
liest possible time?
Indeterminacy of the scope of forum shopping and problems in applying rules
regarding detrimental forum shopping might at some point lead to replacing
the COMI test (which is the focal point of the cross-border insolvency re-
gimes) with a statutory seat test (i.e., one which is based on the place of
incorporation or the registered office).53 Indeed, some commentators argue
47 See J Armour, ‘Abuse of European Insolvency Law? A Discussion’ in R de la Feria & S
Vogenauer (eds), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law?
(Oxford 2011) 164.
48 See Eidenmüller, Abuse (n 3) 16.
49 AWalters and A Smith, ‘‘Bankruptcy tourism’ under the EC Regulation on insolvency
proceedings: a view from England and Wales’ IIR 2010, 19(3) 181, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630890, 39.
50 P Paschalidis, Freedom of Establishment and Private International Law for Corpora-
tions (Oxford 2012), 221.
51 See Eidenmüller, Abuse (n 3) 16.
52 See Moss et al, The EC Regulation (n 46) 262; Paschalidis, Freedom (n 50) 217–21. See
also Advocate General (Colomer) Opinions in Staubitz-Schrieber C-1/04 paras 7–77
and in Frick Teppichboden C-339/07 who has pointed out that Community Law com-
bats opportunistic and fraudulent choices of jurisdiction and not “forum shopping” per
se.
53 This can be contrasted with the ‘real seat’ approach underlying the COMI concept,
which refers to the actual economic centre of the debtor company.
ECFR 4/2013Irit Mevorach532
that a rule that requires companies to file for bankruptcy in their place of
incorporation will make the venue rule more certain and less manipulable.54
Furthermore, the argument holds that such a test will ensure that creditors are
protected in case of reincorporation prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings, at least in Europe, as the 10th ECDirective will require conform-
ing to the creditor protection rules established by the laws of the affected
Member States.55 Admittedly, even with the forthcoming reforms of the
cross-border insolvency frameworks, which now propose to focus on specific
factors for identifying the COMI (primarily the location of the company’s
headquarters / central management),56 COMI will remain, to an extent, fact
sensitive and thus arguably prone to manipulation. COMI determination
would still require a comprehensive assessment of all relevant factors.57 A
formalistic test, which would be based on the statutory seat, could indeed
be more straightforward. However, such a jurisdictional test (in the context
of insolvency) entails numerous disadvantages, not least related to the fact that
it might direct insolvency cases to jurisdictions to which the company has no
genuine connection.58
Generally, a sustained debate regarding the problem of forum shopping could
cast doubt on the merit of universalist cross-border insolvency frameworks. It
will be suggested below that the new emerging directors’ duties regime (dis-
cussed in the next section) could shed light on the extent to which forum
shopping should be allowed. It also has the potential to address problems of
detrimental forum shopping more effectively than cross-border insolvency
frameworks would.
III. Directors’ Obligations in the Period Approaching Insolvency:
Emerging International Benchmarks
In a different context, UNCITRAL59 undertook to deliberate on the topic of
directors’ obligations in the period leading up to insolvency,60 as it considered
54 See e.g. Skeel, European Implication (n 44) 463; L Perkins, ‘Note, A Defense of Pure
Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies’ (2000) 32 NYU J INT’L L &
POL 787; Torremans, Coming to terms (n 44) 181.
55 Eidenmüller, Abuse (n 3) 13.
56 In the current versions of the Regulation and theModel Law, COMI is not defined (it is
only presumed to be located at the place of the registered office).
57 See European Commission Proposal, proposed amendments to recital 13 article 3; UN-
CITRALWP.112, paras 123D–123I.
58 See I Mevorach, ‘Jurisidction in Insolvency: A Study of European Courts’ Decisions’
(2010) 6(2) JPIL 327, 332–35. See further n 88.
59 Via Working Group V (Insolvency Law).
60 See UNCITRALWorking Group V (Insolvency Law) Forty-third session, New York,
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it important to seek a degree of standardisation in this area and enhance the
objectives of the Model Law and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide.61 This
work has proceeded against the backdrop of a myriad of approaches and a
degree of uncertainty as to the actual duties imposed on directors in the time
leading up to insolvency in different legal systems. Indeed, insolvency is often
a gradual and incremental process; thus, it is hard to define in precise terms the
point in time after which insolvency is foreseeable and creditors are at risk and
may be harmed by the actions of the managers. Generally, the dilemma is
whether to defer to the business judgement of directors during that time or
to impose specific obligations to protect creditors during the period approach-
ing insolvency. Some regimes are very protective of creditors and impose a
strict duty on directors to initiate insolvency proceedingswithin a short period
after the occurrence of an insolvency event.62 In other regimes, directors owe
their duties to the company at all times and this does not change as insolvency
approaches.63 Other systems adopt “wrongful trading” provisions (in various
forms),64 which essentially impose a duty on directors to give due regard to the
interests of creditors when they realize that insolvent liquidation is inevita-
ble.65 Some laws provide additional remedies aimed at compensating creditors
for fraudulent behaviour or at deterring mismanagement.66
Drawing from this range of regulatory options, the Working Group of UN-
CITRAL has decided to focus on tackling mismanagement that falls short of
15–19 April 2013, ‘Directors’ obligations in the period approaching insolvency’, A/
CN.9/WG.V/WP.113 (hereafter: UNCITRALWP.113) and Report, forty-third session.
The deliberations were concluded recently and the new recommendations will be added
as Part IVof the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. The final text would be in due course
available on the UNCITRAL website (http://www.uncitral.org). The author had the
privilege of participating in the deliberations as adviser to the United Kingdom dele-
gation. All views expressed here, though, are solely those of the author.
61 A/CN.9/715, Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the work of its thirty-
ninth session (Vienna, 6–10 December 2010) para 56 (hereafter: Report of thirty-ninth
session).
62 This is a common approach in civil law jurisdictions. See e.g. GmbH-Gesetz, § 64(1),
Aktiengesetz, § 92(2)).
63 See e.g. Canadian Business Corporations Act 1985, s 241(2)(c); Peoples Department
Stores Inc. v Wise [2004] SCC 68 [43], though creditors may have redress via oppression
remedies. See generally INSOL International, ‘Directors in the Twilight Zone III’
(2009) 706.
64 See in the UK, s 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
65 Other regimes which adopt a wrongful trading regime include Australia, New Zealand,
Singapore and South Africa. See generally JLWestbrook, CD Booth, C Paulus and H
Rajak, A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems (The World Bank, 2010) 54.
66 See e.g. the English Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986; the English Insol-
vency Act 1986, s 213 (imposing liability for fraudulent trading) and the English Com-
panies Act 2006, s 993 (the criminal offence of fraudulent trading).
ECFR 4/2013Irit Mevorach534
fraud in the period approaching insolvency while acknowledging that legal
regimes may impose additional measures to deter misconduct.67 In this re-
spect, the Working Group specifically favoured flexibility and deference to
directors’ judgement over the more restrictive approaches.68 Thus, the new
standards on directors’ obligations in the period approaching insolvency,
which will be added to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, assert that they
aim to encourage directors to consider rescue possibilities in times of financial
crisis, avoiding risk aversion. It is specifically stated that provisions addressing
the obligation of directors and remedies for breach of duties should be im-
plemented in a way that does not adversely affect successful reorganization,
does not discourage participation in the management of companies, and does
not prevent the exercise of reasonable business judgement or the taking of
reasonable commercial risk.69
At the same time, the recommendations acknowledge that creditors may be at
risk in the period leading up to insolvency and therefore that directors (defined
in broad terms70) must consider creditors’ interests when making decisions
during this time. Thus, the recommendations state that when insolvency is
imminent or unavoidable, the legitimate interests of creditors, as well as those
of other stakeholders, should be protected and that appropriate remedies for
breach of duties to consider these interests should be provided.71 Specifically, it
is recommended that directors take reasonable steps to avoid insolvency, or
minimise its extent when it is unavoidable.72 A range of steps may be reason-
able in the relevant circumstances.73 These might include the initiation of
67 See WP.113, recommendation 12.
68 See Report of thirty-ninth session, para 55.
69 UNCITRALWorking Group V (Insolvency Law) Forty-third session, New York, 15–
19 April 2013, Directors’ obligations in the period approaching insolvency’, A/CN.9/
WG.V/WP.113, recommendations 1 and 2, purpose of legislative provisions (hereafter:
UNCITRALWP.113).
70 The obligation is imposed on those making decisions concerning the management of a
company. Liability may extend to those exercising factual control, which could include
parent companies or creditors (UNCITRALWP.113, recommendations 1 and 2 purpose
of legislative provisions, and recommendation 4). TheWorking Group also considers to
specifically address issues related to directors of enterprise group members (see UN-
CITRALWorking Group V (Insolvency Law) Forty-third session, New York, 15–19
April 2013, ‘Enterprise groups- Directors’ obligations in the period approaching in-
solvency’, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.115). These aspects are outside the scope of this paper.
71 UNCITRALWP.113, recommendations 1 and 2, purpose of legislative provisions.
72 Ibid., recommendation 1.
73 Steps may include: (a) Evaluating the current financial situation of the company and
ensuring proper accounts are being maintained and that they are up-to-date; being
independently informed as to the current and ongoing financial situation of the com-
pany; holding regular board meetings to monitor the situation; seeking professional
advice, including insolvency or legal advice; holding discussions with auditors; calling
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formal insolvency proceedings. However, the proposed standards do not sug-
gest that directors should be obliged to file for insolvency within a specific
period of time. Furthermore, the time at which the obligations above arise is
not defined in precise terms; rather it generally corresponds to a state of factual
insolvency, actual or imminent, before insolvency proceedings have begun.
The steps that should be taken by directors are not prescriptive either, and they
may vary depending on the circumstances. The approach is thus akin to
wrongful trading–type provisions, seeking to hold directors accountable for
misconduct and negligent management and protecting creditors from the de-
terioration of the company’s estate close to insolvency, but not penalizing (but
rather, even encouraging) attempts to turn failing businesses around.
The rationale underlying this policy choice is certainly strong and is consistent
with the set of internationally recognized goals of insolvency. Thus, it had
been agreed almost a decade ago (while deliberating on the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide) that insolvency laws should strive to achieve a range of
goals in a balanced manner.74 Creditors’ wealth should be maximised and their
rights respected, though a series of considerations should be taken into ac-
count. Importantly, the law should balance between liquidation and reorgan-
ization, and the choice between these procedures may reflect social consider-
ations beyond wealth maximisation, including the encouragement of
entrepreneurship and preservation of employment.75 This corresponds with
the “traditionalist” approach to insolvency law, proclaiming that insolvency
law has a broad role to play and a wide range of interests to accommodate.76 It
should give centrality to distributional concerns and look to the survival of
companies as well as to their orderly liquidation,77 offer opportunities for
a shareholder meeting; modifying management practices to take account of the interests
of creditors and other stakeholders; protecting the assets of the company so as to max-
imize value and avoid loss of key assets; considering the structure and functions of the
business to examine viability and reduce expenditure; not committing the company to
enter into the types of transaction that might be subject to avoidance unless there is an
appropriate business justification; continuing to trade in circumstances where it is ap-
propriate to do so tomaximize going concern value; holding negotiations with creditors
or commencing other informal procedures, such as voluntary restructuring negotia-
tions; (b) Commencing or requesting the commencement of formal reorganization or
liquidation proceedings. See ibid., recommendation 2.
74 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, Part one, B, para 3.
75 Ibid Part one, B, para 6.
76 The opposing “proceduralist” approach sees insolvency law as a mere collectivised debt
collection device and focuses on a single objective- maximising the collective return to
creditors (see e.g. TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard
University Press, 1986); DG Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganisations’
(1986) 15 Journal of Legal Studies 127).
77 See e.g. E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect world’ (1993) 92 Mich L
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continuation, reorganization, and rehabilitation, and provide time for adjust-
ments.78 Since UNCITRAL’s agreement on the insolvency goals, the emphasis
on enabling rescues has gained further support, and to date the process of
rescue and rehabilitation of businesses is recognized by all international trea-
ties dealingwith insolvency and is provided for in a substantial number of legal
systems.79 Indeed, full rescues of companies may be a practical option in but
only a minority of cases, and a rehabilitation is often not feasible, but the idea
is to provide a legal environment that would allow some sort of rescue (even if
only of the business) in cases where the business is viable. In this respect, early
action by those who are aware of the company’s financial situation is crucial.
The proposed directors’ duties regime follows this balanced approach. On the
one hand, it aims to promote efficiency and maximise wealth by reducing
financial agency costs associated with management’s perverse incentives to
take excessive risks at the expense of creditors in the period approaching
insolvency.80 At the same time, the proposed benchmarks direct policy makers
to avoid a regime, which is too strict, that is, one that would prohibit insolvent
trading or oblige directors to take all possible steps when the company is
facing difficulties. As a result, directors may not be too risk averse when
operating within such a framework and could be encouraged to consider
rescue possibilities or other solutions that would be beneficial to the body
of creditors and other stakeholders, as soon as they realize that the company is
in financial difficulties.
IV. Forum Shopping within a Directors’ Duties Framework
Allowing directors to relocate the company when facing financial trouble
could generally fit with the obligation enshrined in the new international
benchmarks discussed above. Under the proposed regime, directors would
Rev 336; DR Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bank-
ruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Texas L Rev 541.
78 See V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 46.
79 Westbrook et al, A Global View (n 65) 124. See also the recently published communi-
cation from the EU Commission to the European Parliament proposing a new Euro-
pean approach to business failure and insolvency. Specifically, it is suggested that Europe
would create an efficient system to restore and reorganize businesses so that they can
survive the financial crises, operate more efficiently and when necessary, make a fresh
start (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council
and the European Economic and social Committee, A new European approach to
business failure and insolvency, COM(2012) 742 final, 12. 12. 2012).
80 See e.g. A Keay, ‘The Director’s Duty to Take into Account the Interests of Company
Creditors: Where is it triggered’ (2001) 25 Melb Univ L Rev 318; RJ Mokal, Corporate
Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (Oxford 2005) 274–77.
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be expected to take steps to search for a solution that would benefit the
company’s stakeholders as a whole and in particular to consider the feasibility
of rescuing the business or the company. Indeed, such solutions may be avail-
able in foreign legal systems. This part of the paper will consider the ambit of
legitimate forum shopping when considered from the perspective of directors’
duties. It will also show how the directors’ duties regime might control detri-
mental forum shopping. Finally, it will distinguish between the problem of
detrimental forum shopping and other scenarios of abuse and conflict con-
cerned with the opening of insolvency proceedings in a cross-border context.
1. Relocation as a way to minimise the effect of insolvency
In the absence of a fully harmonized insolvency regime and unified restructur-
ing procedures, differences between legal regimes are still significant. Even
within Europe, insolvency laws vary considerably andMember States’systems
offer a range of advantages and disadvantages to financially troubled compa-
nies.81 In practice, companies have occasionally taken advantage of this range
of insolvency options and relocated their COMI to a foreign jurisdiction
before the initiation of insolvency proceedings in order to facilitate a rescue
or a restructuring. In the PINGroup case, for example, the company directors
sought to initiate proceedings in Germany, following the move of the com-
pany’s COMI from Luxembourg, in order to save the group as a whole.82 In
Gallery Capital, the COMIs of the BVI and Luxembourgian companies were
relocated to the UK in order to pursue a restructuring via the UK scheme of
arrangement procedure.83 A corporate migration of this sort, that is, one that is
aimed at seeking better insolvency outcomes for the business in distress, for
the benefit of the creditors and other stakeholders, is largely consistent with
the aim and underlying policy of the directors’ duties regime proposed as an
international benchmark. It expands the options available to directors seeking
the best solution for the company and the creditors as a whole.
The costs of relocation must be considered, though. Indeed, migration may be
expensive and may delay the effective administration of the debtor’s affairs.84
81 Indeed, the UK restructuring procedures have been particularly attractive to foreign
companies due to the flexibility which English insolvency law grants companies in this
respect, as noted in the recent Impact Assessment (of the EC Insolvency Regulation)
published by the European Commission (European Commission, Impact Assessment
Accompanying the document Revision of Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on insol-
vency proceedings, 12. 12. 2002, SWD (2012) 416 final, p 20).
82 PIN Group SA (Amtsgericht Köln, 19 February) (73 IE 1-08).
83 Gallery Capital S.A v In the Matter of Gallery Media Group Ltd (2010) WL 4777509.
84 See Walters and Smith, Bankruptcy tourism (n 49) 33.
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Specially, if the COMI test is adopted (and it will be argued below that it
should be) the relocation will involve giving notices to creditors and establish-
ing an actual economic link in the new jurisdiction, which could entail greater
costs compared with a regime, which would allow more tenuous connections
with the new jurisdiction. Whether or not relocation can assist insolvency
avoidance or minimise the effect of insolvency depends, therefore, on wider
considerations of relocation implications beyond a mere comparison of avail-
able procedures in the local and the foreign fora. Yet, where all of the above
implications have been properly considered, a decision to relocate could com-
ply with the directors’ obligations in the period leading up to insolvency.
2. The ambit of legitimate forum shopping
While the directors’ duties regime generally supports relocation, its legitimacy
would depend on whether or not the relocation was predicated on a desire to
improve the position of the general body of creditors. Therefore, self-serving
relocations for the purpose of escaping liabilities, prolonging the entry into
insolvency proceedings, retaining the managing position and so forth, as well
as relocations aimed at benefiting a section of the stakeholders must be re-
garded detrimental (i.e. wrongful).85 Such relocations cannot meet the stand-
ard duty of taking steps near insolvency to avoid insolvency or minimise its
affect for the benefit of the stakeholders as a whole.
This does not imply, though, that relocations, which turned out to be unsuc-
cessful or relocations affected without the consent of all creditors are neces-
sarily detrimental. The directors’ duties regime requires consideration of the
interests of the stakeholders as a whole, rather than negotiating with every
stakeholder. Indeed, seeking the consent of all stakeholders before moving to a
different jurisdiction could be time consuming and even unrealistic in an in-
solvency environment where there may be numerous stakeholders with com-
peting interests. It could also result in “holdout” strategies by creditors who
may seek to curtail a beneficial move to gain an advantage on the expense of the
general body of creditors. Requiring that the relocation be successful, in that it
maximised the net assets, in order to escape liabilities, would also be too
stringent. Specifically, such ex post examination of the effect of the move
would be contrary to the flexible directors’ duties regime, which balances
between creditor protection and promotion of rescues, encouraging directors
to consider responsibly what could be the best option for their business. Thus,
liability should not be premised on measuring the degree of success of the
85 As a minimum standard. Relocation may also be fraudulent.
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migration but rather the reasonableness of the directors’ decision to take such
a step.
3. The benefits and limitations of the COMI test
Legitimising some type of forum shopping under cross-border insolvency
frameworks would be, therefore, consistent with the general benchmarks re-
garding directors’ obligations in the period leading up to insolvency. Thus, the
fact that the COMI may be moved or that relocations as such are not always
prevented is not, from the viewpoint of the directors’ duties regime, a problem.
In fact, the ability to move is consistent with the obligation regime, and thus
there is less scope for criticising cross-border insolvency frameworks on these
grounds. Preventing detrimental (i.e., wrongful) forum shopping is also com-
patible with the directors’ duties regime. Yet, there is only so much that the
cross-border insolvency regime itself, namely the private international aspects
of insolvency, can do to address situations of debtor detrimental forum shop-
ping.
Indeed, by imposing a jurisdictional test such as COMI, which focuses on the
actual economic centre of the company, cross-border insolvency regimes assist
in preventing detrimental forum shopping. This sort of test also meets the
concern of cross-border insolvency regimes that ascertaining jurisdiction
would be consistent with creditors’ expectations regarding the location of
the insolvency process. It is inherent to the COMI test that creditors must
remain on board in the course of relocation decisions in the period leading up
to insolvency. The test requires that the insolvency forum be ascertainable by
third parties.86 Migration of the actual COMI would involve, therefore, con-
sultation and negotiations with the creditors from the new location during the
period before the institution of the proceedings,87 making it harder for com-
panies to relocate self-servingly. The recent proposed refinements of the
COMI analysis which suggest that the test will be primarily based on a key
connecting factor, the actual centre of management of the company, would
further limit the choice of forum to a specific location and one to which the
company has a real economic connection.88
86 See European Insolvency Regulation, Recital 13. The ECJ in Eurofood IFSC Ltd (Case
C-341/04) [2006] and in Interedil Srl (Case C-396/09) [2011] emphasized the impor-
tance of the ascertainability of COMI.
87 This is compatible with the guidance provided in Irish Bank Resolution Corporation v
Quinn [2012] NICh 1 at [28] regarding the requirement that COMI should be ascer-
tainable by third parties.
88 See European Commission Proposal, proposed amended art. 3(1); UNCITRAL
wp. 112, para 123F and Report, forty-third session, para 38. The COMI test entails
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Any jurisdictional test can be manipulated, though. Thus, directors may not
reveal the actual motivation for a move of the COMI and breach their obli-
gations to the creditors as a whole. This is true whether a jurisdictional test is
based on the company’s COMI or on its statutory seat. The registered office,
too, could be manipulated before commencing insolvency.89 Indeed, economic
analysis predicts that directors will be more prone to take excessive risks at the
expense of creditors at times of financial difficulty. Thus, when considering
relocation, directors may tend to dismiss the potential costs of a move, as they
have less to lose and more to gain by seeking new opportunities at a time of
distress. They may even move especially and deliberately to evade liabilities
and to achieve personal gains, if they foresee that insolvency proceedings are
approaching. Especially the weaker unsecured creditors might not be in a
position to protect themselves from such risks in the period approaching
insolvency.90 Sophisticated, powerful creditors may be in a relatively better
position and require that the company not only inform them but also consult
with them prior to COMI movements. Indeed, directors may collude with
some of the creditors in the course of relocation, or negotiate with a fraction of
the stakeholders, if it seems that the prospects abroadmay benefit that fraction
over other creditors.91
Yet, the efficacy of cross-border insolvency frameworks would be curtailed if
courts applying the frameworks would need to go beyond the COMI deter-
mination to verify whether the relocation was detrimental. Thus, claims re-
various other important advantages. As it reflects a real seat of the company, it prevents
the process from being handled in “haven” jurisdictions in which the company may
have incorporated for various reasons but to which the company has no genuine con-
nection (see JLWestbrook, ‘Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm’ 32 BROOK J
INT’L L 1019, 1030). Where the cross-border insolvency case involves members of a
corporate group, the COMI test often allows centralization of the proceedings at the
meeting point (central administration) of all the group entities that, although they had
their registered offices in different countries, were all centrally controlled and therefore
had their COMIs in the same forum. This can prevent multiple proceedings and allows
for the achievement of group-wide rescues or going concern sales of the business as a
whole (see I Mevorach, ‘The Home Country of a Multinational Enterprise Group
Facing Insolvency’ 57 ICLQ 427; Mevorach, Jurisdiction (n 58) 334. See also European
Commission Proposal, proposed new Recital 20 b).
89 See Hughes v. Hannover Ruckversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft [1997] 1 BCLC 497
(CA) where a company devised a ‘redomestication’ scheme whereby it re-registered
in Bermuda and then asked to be wound up there, leaving behind in the US the profit-
able parts of the business (hived down to a new company) and abandoning the creditors
with asbestos related claims. See further Fletcher, Insolvency (n 10) 222, 238–9.
90 c.f. Ringe, Forum shopping (n 44) 602, who argues that it is the creditor’s responsibility
to take protection against such risks (e.g. by including ‘anti-migration’ covenants and
warranties in the lending agreements).
91 See also Walters and Smith, Bankruptcy tourism (n 49) 39.
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garding the motivations and consequences of relocation may involve complex
issues of law and evidence that might need to be tested at full trial. Decisions
on commencement and recognition of insolvency proceedings based on cross-
border insolvency models, on the other hand, must be swift.92 In addition,
even if a court opening insolvency proceeding could address forum shopping
allegations promptly, a refusal to open insolvency proceedings in the new
jurisdiction, even though the COMI was relocated to that jurisdiction from
the original forum, could entail significant additional costs. It would require
the COMI to be moved back to the original forum. Otherwise, if the COMI
were to remain in the new forum but the proceedings were opened in the
original one, the scheme of the cross-border insolvency framework (requiring
matching the COMI with the place where proceedings would be adminis-
tered) would be distorted. There may also be costs involved in handling the
case in a forum that no longer represents the economic centre of the company,
in terms of gathering information and evidence.
Considering the legitimacy of forum shopping at the recognition stage is even
more problematic. It would mean second-guessing the decision of the court
that opened the original proceedings. This would entail adverse consequences
in terms of certainty and finality of judgements, international cooperation, and
the need to give prompt effect to the opening of insolvency proceedings. In-
deed, allegations regarding wrongful relocation would normally fall below the
high threshold of the “public policy” exception under which recognation
could be denied.93 Even where forum shopping involved defrauding creditors
(which might amount to a public policy matter), it would be more effective to
deal with any such allegations at a later stage of the process, especially if the
claims require further investigation, rather than to deny recognition.
4. Dealing with wrongful relocations via directors’ duties regimes
The new international standards on directors’ obligations in the vicinity of
insolvency has the potential to provide an alternative regime for dealing with
detrimental relocations of companies. The standards are not confined to
92 The European Insolvency Regulation proclaims that: ‘. . . cross-border insolvency pro-
ceedings should operate efficiently and effectively and this Regulation needs to be
adopted in order to achieve this objective. . .’ (recital 2); Art. 17(3) of the Model Law
requires that an application for recognition of a foreign proceeding shall be decided
upon at the earliest possible time.
93 Recognition may be denied only where it would be “manifestly” contrary to public
policy to recognise the foreign proceedings, i.e. when the opening proceedings in the
foreign court prevented fair trial (seeEurofood IFSCLtd (Case C-341/04) [2006] at [60–
68]).
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wrongful trading as such, but rather they require more generally that directors
take reasonable steps to avoid insolvency or minimise its extent (at times of
financial distress) while having due regard for the interests of creditors and
other stakeholders.94 Decisions regarding the location of filing for insolvency
could be regarded as falling within the scope of such obligations. In this
respect, going abroad may be a step in the right direction, as suggested above,
so long as the directors considered the downsides of relocation and their
decision was predicated on a desire to benefit the creditors as a whole. Con-
sidering the complexities involved in moving the company to a different juris-
diction it would be desirable, though, to require that directors attempting to
take such a step accompany it with certain additional steps that would support
the decision and ensure its viability and overall benefit. These may include
seeking professional advice regarding the implications of the relocation, in-
cluding about any obstacles in the local jurisdiction in terms of restructuring
opportunities and the likelihood of a decrease in value of the business if the
options available locally are pursued. For the same reason, it would also be
desirable to go somewhat beyond the usual steps expected of directors making
decisions in the period approaching insolvency and require that they be able to
positively demonstrate and justify that their decisions and actions were pre-
dicated on a desire to act in the best interests of creditors as a whole. In other
words, in cases of relocations in close proximity to insolvency, the burden
would be on the directors to show that they had taken into account the
benefits and the effects on the general body of creditors and had reached the
decision to relocate the company with such considerations in mind. Specifi-
cally, they should be able to demonstrate that at the time of deciding to relocate
it appeared that going abroad would result in a better outcome for the cred-
itors as a whole compared with staying in the original jurisdiction.
It would be wrong, though, to view beneficial relocations that had the poten-
tial to result in a better outcome to creditors as required steps to take before
initiating insolvency proceedings. First, there may be countless different op-
portunities abroad, of which directors may not be aware. Seeking information
about all possible solutions beyond what is available locally cannot be re-
garded a reasonable step, which is what the obligations’ regime requires.95
Second, even where directors become aware of certain opportunities abroad,
94 UNCITRALWP.113, recommendation 2. It should be noted that even where legislation
refers specifically to wrongful trading, trading in this respect probably includes non-
trading activities (see regarding the English regime R Goode, Principles of Corporate
Insolvency Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 667).
95 c.f. the English wrongful trading provision which provides a defence for directors who
took every step (with a view tominimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors)
when they first acquired deemed knowledge that insolvent liquidation was inevitable.
Yet, other elements of the provision refer to what is reasonably expected of persons
ECFR 4/2013 Forum Shopping in Times of Crisis: A Directors’ Duties Perspective 543
they may consider it undesirable to move the company to a different country,
not because it does not provide an efficient system for corporate rescue, but
due to other legitimate business considerations. Indeed, business decisions
concerned with entering into foreign markets, or else remaining local, are
often led by economic factors.96 Cultural differences may also be relevant.
Especially if reorganization is sought, the location of the actual centre of the
recovered company could be critical, and the company may not want to go
through the process of moving back to the original forum once again.
5. Accessible and effective remedies
Directors’ duties regimes, if compatible with the international benchmarks,
could therefore address detrimental forum shopping. Allegations against di-
rectors could be raised, for example, in the COMI forum, but not necessarily
at the time when the proceedings are opened. The COMI forummay apply its
directors’ duties laws if the choice of law rule under the relevant cross-border
insolvency framework refers to the law of the forumwith regard to insolvency
related matters. Indeed, as the matter of directors’ pre-insolvency duties is
closely linked to insolvency, there is merit in the concentration of the litigation
against directors in the COMI forum and in the application of its laws. This
approach would neatly correspond with the EU Regulation scheme, which as
noted above, provides that, subject to exceptions, the law applicable to insol-
vency proceedings and their effects shall be that of the insolvency forum
(where proceedings are opened).97 The EU Commission also proposes to
add a provision to the EU Regulation, which will clarify that the insolvency
forum shall have jurisdiction over actions related to insolvency. It is specifi-
cally mentioned in this respect that this could be the case if the liquidator
wishes to combine an action for director’s liability based on insolvency law
with an action based on company law or general tort law.98 Thus, even if the
relevant directors’ duties regime is provided for in a law other than insolvency
law, and this is the basis of the action against the director, the action may be
pursued in the insolvency forum. As noted above, the Model Law does not
provide for jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules. It is, therefore, possible under
theModel Law’s scheme to either invoke the COMI’s forum laws (and seek to
recognize and enforce the judgement in the receiving court), or to invoke the
laws of the enacting State. This gives parties a degree of flexibility when
carrying on the same functions, which suggest that ‘every step’ actually means every
reasonable step (see Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (n 110) 673).
96 See PT Muchlinski,Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford 2007) 40.
97 European Insolvency Regulation, art. 4.
98 European Commission Proposal, proposed art. 3 a and proposed recital 13 b.
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attempting to pursue culpable managers, but in any event, the proceedings will
be based on invoking directors’ duties regimes at any stage of the proceedings
without delaying the recognition process.
It is crucial, though, that a directors’ duties regime would be accessible and
that it could be called upon effectively. It might be somewhat unrealistic to
expect that office-holders would instigate proceedings against directors in the
course of rescue proceedings, particularly where the same office-holders
acted in an advisory capacity in connection to the relocation. Indeed, the
actions against the directors may be brought later in a successor proceeding,
e.g. a liquidation arising after administration. Yet, to increase the effectiveness
of the regime, it is important that remedies against directors will be available
in the course of other types of proceedings, i.e. that they can be invoked by
administrators or trustees, and not only by liquidators.99 Creditors should
also be allowed to bring such actions. The court itself should be required to
consider the effects of relocation and in the relevant circumstances prompt
office-holders to instigate an investigation or to take into account the impli-
cations of the move in the context of a proposed reorganization plan. Courts
may also impose conditions when opening insolvency proceedings or when
recognizing foreign proceedings, with regard to further investigations against
directors or, when it is clear that relocation involved misconduct, regarding
possible contributions from directors or subordination of their claims. In
cases of conflict of interests, it should be possible to appoint a different
office-holder who may be in a better position to take on board such inves-
tigations.
Another problem is how to fund the litigation. Office-holders may be reluc-
tant to utilize funds of the insolvency estate to cover the costs of initiating and
handling the proceedings, especially given that success cannot be guaranteed.
The UNCITRAL recommendations regarding directiors’ pre-insolveny du-
ties acknowledge this problem and suggest that the insolvency law should
specify that the costs of proceedings against a director be paid as administra-
tive expenses and that the law may provide alternative approaches to address
the pursuit and funding of such proceedings.100 The commentary to the rec-
ommendations mentions such possible different approaches, including assign-
ing, for value, the right to commence the proceedings to a third party. It is also
99 This is compatible with UNCITRAL’s recommendations that enforcement of the
remedies will not be limited to specific types of proceedings (UNCITRALWP.113,
recommendations 1 and 2, purpose of legislative provisions). See also current proposal
of the UK government to make fraudulent and wrongful trading remedies available in
administration (http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/insolvency/docs/insolvency%20pro-
fession/consultations/redtapechallenge/rtc-consultation.pdf).
100 UNCITRALWP.113, recommendations 10 and 11.
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mentioned that in some instances, claims against directors might be settled.101
This could reduce costs and minimize efforts of finding further funding, es-
pecially in circumstances where the likelihood of success is doubtful.
It should also be borne in mind that in some cases, the scale of the company’s
losses may be many times more than the directors’ means- individually and
collectively- to compensate those who have suffered losses. Including rem-
edies such as subordination of directors’ claims to those of external creditors
(or the elimination of such claims) in addition to contribution orders could
provide some additional compensation in situations where directors have
claims against the company as creditors, releasing more of the insolvency
estate for external creditors. Additionally, where the company is a member
of a corporate group often other entities, usually a parent company, may be the
director (broadly defined) and is likely to have a deeper pocket.102
Generally, it must be acknowledged that wrongful trading proceedings are to
some extent a speculative venture, especially since the regime is flexible and
does not prescribe a specific time when directors should consider the interests
of the creditors. Nonetheless, it is still preferable to address issues related to
debtor misconduct in the course of the insolvency process rather than at the
stage of opening or recognizing foreign proceedings, for the reasons explained
above. It is also important to clarify to directors what is required of themwhen
they consider relocation, with the expectation that this will deter mismanage-
ment.
6. Conflicts among creditors
Wrongful relocation should be distinguished from scenarios in which a deci-
sion to move, although predicated on a desire to benefit the stakeholders as a
whole, was harmful to some of the creditors. Indeed, creditors may have
conflicting interests with regard to a given relocation, especially owing to
differences in the priority rules of the respective insolvency systems. Thus, a
particular group of creditors might be worse off because of the relocation even
if the move is considered beneficial overall. The solution in such cases may be
compromises, determined on a case-by-case basis. Thus, when creditors are
able to show that they could have received more in proceedings in the original
jurisdiction fromwhich the COMIwasmoved, this may be taken into account
in the course of devising the scheme in the new forum or by way of applying
the foreign (rather than the forum’s) law. It would be a more effective solution
101 UNCITRALWP.113, para 51.
102 See I Mevorach, The role of enterprise principles in shaping management duties at
times of crisis (forthcoming, EBOR).
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than returning a case to the original forum or commencing multiple proceed-
ings. Similar solutions have been devised in practice to avoid the opening of
additional territorial (i.e., secondary) proceedings in cross-border insolvencies
under the EU Regulation, whereby the court of the main proceedings applies
the law of the secondary forum without actually opening secondary proceed-
ings, thus preventing the associated cost of conducting multiple proceed-
ings.103
7. False claims regarding the COMI
Cases involving wrongful relocations should also be distinguished from cases
of abuse of process whereby debtors deliberately misrepresent the COMI or
falsely claim that COMI is in a particular jurisdiction. Examples include, in
Europe, the case ofHans Brochier,104 in which the debtor distorted the facts to
claim that the company’s head office was in the UK, while it was actually in
Germany.105 On the global level, in Cenargo,106 the company, foreseeing its
collapse, attempted to pick the US as its bankruptcy jurisdiction.107 For this
purpose, the English parent company and various subsidiaries presented a
Chapter 11 petition in the US, even though the only connection the group
had to the US was bank accounts opened shortly prior to the opening of
proceedings and the fact that certain creditors were based in the US.108
These types of cases fall within the ambit of the cross-border insolvency
frameworks under which the court should ascertain the connecting factors
between the company and the jurisdiction i.e. the location of the COMI.
Indeed, in these cases the investigation of which jurisdiction is the proper
one should result in refusal to open proceedings (or refusal to recognize the
proceedings as the main proceedings under the recognition-based regimes),
103 See e.g. Re Collins & Aikman Corp Group [2005] EWHC 1754 (Ch).
104 Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd v Exner Chancery Division [2006] EWHC 2594 (Ch),
[2007] BCC 127.
105 Indeed, the English court (finding that COMI was actually in Germany) refused to
open main proceedings in the UK.
106 ReNorse Irish Ferries &CenargoNavigation Limited (unreported, 20 February 2003);
In re Cenargo International Plc, 294 BR 571 (Bankr SDNY 2003)). The case took place
prior to the adoption of the Model Law in UK and US legislation.
107 This enabled the directors to remain in control through the ‘debtor in possession’
notion.
108 See LM LoPucki,Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is Corrupting the
Bankruptcy Courts (Ann Arbor 2005) 189, 191–3 and 204–205. See also Yucos Oil Co,
Re (Unreported, February 24, 2005) (SD Tex (US)) and G. Moss, ‘Dismissal of Yucos
Chapter 11 Proceedings’ (2005) 18(5) Insolv Int 77.
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since the COMI is not present in the new forum. The question in these cases is
where the COMI is rather than whether its relocation was wrongful.
8. Neglect of creditors in the host country
Another possible scenario, which might be confused with situations of
wrongful relocation, would involve a COMI move whereby the new forum
neglects the foreign creditors. In this scenario, the move might have been
predicated on a desire to benefit some creditors as a whole, but in fact, the
new forum fails to accommodate some foreign creditors. These scenarios too
should be controlled by the cross-border insolvency regime. Indeed, the
cross-border insolvency models require that foreign creditors not be discri-
minated against.109 All creditors should have the right to be heard and right to
participate in the proceedings.110 If the new forum nonetheless discriminates
against foreign creditors and denies them of their right to due process, the
public policy exception in the cross-border insolvency models should apply,
as a basis for non-recognition and subsequently, where required, the opening
of local proceedings. The same conclusion might be reached, in the old fo-
rum, in cases where the COMI has moved but no proceedings were opened
by the company in the new forum and creditors are not in a position to open
such proceedings themselves, since the new forum denies them of due process
or is otherwise manifestly unfair.
V. Problems of Harmnoziation and Compliance
For the directors’ duties regime to work effectively it must also be available
worldwide. Otherwise, the court that will deal with the company’s insolvency
(e.g., the COMI forum, subject to the relevant choice of law rule) may not be
equipped to address breaches of the relevant duties. Directors, in turn, may not
be deterred from acting wrongly, since their predicted tendency to be more
adventurous at this stage would not be fully controlled. They will be able to
seek more lenient regimes unless forum shopping is denied, but in that case,
the benefit of relocation would be curtailed as well.
This highlights the importance of the new standards developed by UNCI-
TRAL, though obviously their effectiveness depends on compliance at the
109 European Insolvency Regulation, arts. 39 and 40; Model Law, arts. 13 and 14.
110 See also the EuropeanCommission proposal to improve the procedural framework for
determining jurisdiction, which is aimed at ensuring that creditors can effectively
exercise their rights in the court seized of the request to open insolvency proceedings
(text to n 32).
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national level, namely on actual harmonization and standardisation in this
area. Sceptics of harmonization would raise the concern that legal diversity
yields solutions that are more efficient for companies since managers can then
cherry-pick the most suitable regime for their company.111 This argument is
less forceful, though, with regard to rules addressing management behaviour
close to the time of insolvency when creditors are the main concern and
directors’ conduct is less likely to be controlled by market forces.112 Addition-
ally, compliance with benchmarks regarding directors’ duties does not entail a
wholesale harmonization of the insolvency laws. Importantly, legal regimes
may still develop their own rescue procedures. In fact, because the emerging
benchmarks regarding directors’ duties put much emphasis on deference to
directors’ business judgement and on encouraging rescues, they can be under-
stood as allowing relocations that are aimed at seeking viable reorganization
solutions. Therefore, the benchmarks could promote rather than impede cor-
porate mobility and constructive competition. Harmonization of pre-crisis
managerial behaviour rules would make the migratory process a race to the
top, though, rather than to the bottom.
Harmonization entails another risk, though, since it could prevent innovation
and result in the stagnation of legal regimes, which may become inflexible and
unresponsive to changing market conditions and firm demands.113 Yet, this
problem is more apparent with regard to rigid top-down harmonization in the
form of, for example, directly applicable regulations or binding directive,114
while a legislative guide merely contains recommendations which local policy
makers may or may not follow. Indeed, this high degree of flexibility could be
a critical limitation of the benchmarks as means of standardisation. It can be
predicted that the standards, which will appear in theUNCITRALLegislative
Guide as a set of non-binding recommendations, will not make any actual
impact on national legal systems, which will remain diverse and will fail to
meet the proposed benchmark. Indeed, it has been argued that harmonization
111 See RK Winter, ‘State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 251, 291–2; DR Fischel, ‘The “Race to the
Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporate
Law’ (1982) 76 Nw U L Rev 913, 922; FH Easterbrook, ‘The Race for the Bottom
in Corporate Governance’ (2009) 95 Va L Rev 685, 688.
112 LA Bebchuk, ‘The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, Forward to
Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law’ (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 1395,
1405–06; FH Easterbrook andDR Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ 89 Colum LRev
1416, 1436–42.
113 See e.g. L Enriques and M Gatti, ‘The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law
Harmonization in the EuropeanUnion’ (2006) 27U Pa J Int’l Econ L 939, 973 and 976.
114 Under EC law, directives require implementation and thus allow some flexibility in the
transposition into national laws, however Member States are bound by the Directives’
principles (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art.288).
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of substantive insolvency laws is generally unattainable given the lack of a
supranational authority that can command uniformity.115 It was argued further
that this suggests that harmonization depends on reaching a consensus on the
relevant rules, but even where such agreement is achievable, it may not be a
real consensus, but rather the result of dominant groups’ pressures on the
expense of other stakeholders.116
However, the work undertaken by UNCITRAL (the body that adopted the
standards) builds on wide representation and is based on thorough delibera-
tions which culminate in consensual decisions.117 Arguments regarding the
attainability of harmonization also underestimate current pressures on insol-
vency systems to converge.118 Specifically, the emerging benchmarks already
reflect some similarity in the approaches of domestic regimes to directors’ pre-
insolvency duties. The recommendations were drawn from national experi-
ences. Indeed, UNCITRAL has found that notwithstanding the differences in
how directors’ obligations are formulated, the underlying rationale may be
similar and certain common aspects of the required standards can be identi-
fied.119 The recommendations, therefore, may not totally “reinvent the wheel”
for many legal systems, but assist in refining existing laws when these may
undergo revision or renovation. Indeed, the general task of the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide is twofold – to identify common ground and to suggest how
to revise laws to meet new challenges, i.e., to harmonize and to modernize.120
Specifically, for legal systems like that of the UK, which adopt wrongful
trading provisions that are generally compatible with the benchmarks, taking
note of the international deliberations could assist in clarifying, for example,
the steps that are regarded as reasonable when attempting to avoid insolvency,
as a matter of international consensus.121 Importantly, with regard to the pro-
blem of forum shopping, the acceptance of the directors’ duties regime on the
international level could provide legitimacy for accepting companies into the
jurisdiction if they attempt to make use of developed reorganization or re-
115 EJ Janger, ‘Universal Proceduralism’ (2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 819, 831.
116 Ibid 834.
117 See S Block-Lieb and T Halliday, ‘Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking’ (2007) 32
Brook J Int’l L 851, 899, noting that the legitimacy of the work undertaken by UN-
CITRAL is built on three foundations: representativeness, procedural fairness and
effectiveness.
118 Specifically because it is an area which requires market symmetry (see Westbrook, A
Global Solution (n 29) 2288—92).
119 UNCITRALWorking Group V (Insolvency Law), Forty-first session, New York, 30
April- 4 May, 2012, ‘Directors’ obligations in the period approaching insolvency’, A/
CN.9/WG.V/WP.104, para 28.
120 See S Block-Lieb and THalliday, ‘Harmonization andModernization in UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ (2007) 42 Tex Int’l L J 475, 476—7 and 488–98.
121 The UK wrongful trading provision does not delineate any such steps.
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structuring regimes. At the same time, it could be accepted that if directors did
not have due regard for creditors’ interests in the process and they are not able
to justify their move in view of their general obligations, theymay be liable for
their actions.
The benchmarks can be evenmore significant for less developed regimes or for
regimes that are so strict as to impede rescues.122 It is also becoming apparent
that the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide is making some actual impact on
national laws. The Working Group of UNCITRAL noted in one of its recent
meetings that ‘[S]everal international organizations reported on activities re-
lating to the promotion of UNCITRAL texts and noted in particular the
extensive use of the Legislative Guide as a basis for law reform and the dis-
semination of information on the work of UNCITRAL’.123 It is not incon-
ceivable, therefore, that national policy makers will also consider the new
recommendations on directors’ duties favourably. It is also hoped that the
European regulator will have regard for the new standards, especially because
within the EU, being an integrated market, harmonization endeavours in
corporate insolvency law are more likely. Indeed, the EU Parliament has
put forward a proposal for the harmonization of certain matters pertaining
to insolvency law.124 The EU Commission has decided to consider the pro-
posal further.125 Alarmingly, though, some aspects of EU Parliament proposal
seem incompatible with the obligations regime formulated on the internation-
al level, as they suggest adopting a uniform rule, which would require the
opening of insolvency proceedings within a short period of time after the
cessation of payment.126 In its communication, though, the Commission notes
the differences between legal regimes in terms of rules for mandatory filing of
insolvency and seems to accept that imposing tight timeframes in this respect
could adversely affect the company’s ability to solve its financial difficulties.127
122 See A/CN.9/715, Report of UNCITRALWorking Group V (Insolvency Law) on the
work of its Thirty-ninth session (Vienna, 6–10 December 2010), para 62.
123 See A/CN.9/742, Report of UNCITRALWorking Group V (Insolvency Law) on the
work of its Forty-first session (New York. 30 April- 4 May 2012), para 103.
124 European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on insol-
vency proceedings in the context of EU company law, 2011/2006(INI) – 15/11/2011
(hereafter: European Parliament resolution).
125 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and
the European Economic and Social Committee, A newEuropean approach to business
failure and insolvency, 12. 12. 2012 COM (2012) 742 final, ch 5 (hereafter: Communi-
cation from the Commission).
126 European Parliament Resolution, Part 1, para 1.1.
127 Communication from the Commission, ch 3, para 3.3. It also commissioned a study on
“Directors’ duties and liabilities in the EU” (prepared for the European Commission,
DG Market by LSE Enterprise, London, December 2012: http://ec.europa.eu/inter-
nal_market/company/board/index_en.htm).
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VI. Concluding Remarks
Forthcoming amendments of the main cross-border insolvency frameworks
are likely to resolve the indeterminacy that surrounded the jurisdictional test
enshrined in these regimes, by refining the meaning of COMI.128 They are also
likely to limit manipulation of the COMI location, as the test would become
even more focused on a specific connecting factor and on the actual economic
centre of the company. The clarifications concerning COMI movement are
also welcomed since they may restrict attacks on relocations in the vicinity of
insolvency to situations of detrimental forum shopping only. Commendably,
thus far suggestions to impose “look-back” periods that would restrict move-
ments to specific period of time before the initiation of insolvency proceedings
were not taken on board.129 This restrained approach regarding the forum
shopping phenomenon is compatible with the balanced and flexible regime
adopted by UNCITRAL regarding directors’ obligations in times of financial
crisis. However, it is unlikely that the cross-border insolvency frameworks as
such, even after their renovation, would fully resolve the forum shopping
debate and provide the appropriate means for tackling debtor misconduct
prior to insolvency. It might still be unclear what would amount to detrimental
forum shopping under the frameworks and how detriment might be proved in
the course of opening or recognizing foreign insolvency proceedings.
The ambit of legitimate forum shopping would become clearer, though, if the
forum shopping dilemma is linked directly to the regulation of directors’
duties in the vicinity of insolvency. In this regard, the regime agreed upon
on the international level now requires that when insolvency is predicted,
directors should take active steps to minimise the extent of insolvency and
avoid it where possible. Forum relocation could be seen as the taking of such
steps, where it was predicated on the desire to benefit the creditors as a whole.
Accordingly, directors or other corporate controllers involved in a decision to
relocate should be able to demonstrate the motivation for the move and to
128 See n 96 and accompanying text.
129 See e.g. proposals published by INSOL Europe which suggest that if COMI was
moved less than a year before the commencement of proceedings, then the previous
COMI will have international jurisdiction, so long as liabilities to creditors remain
unpaid and unless those creditors consent in writing to the transfer (Revision of the
European InsolvencyRegulation, Proposals by INSOLEurope, proposed amendment
to article 3(1) of the European InsolvencyRegulation). Cf.: Global Principle 13.5 of the
American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute, “Transnational
Insolvency Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases”,
Report (2012) (IF Fletcher and B Wessels, Joint Reporters) which proposes a similar
concept but with no time limits and a degree of flexibility in determining whether
creditors were prejudiced as a result of the relocation. See also Walters and Smith,
Bankruptcy tourism (n 49) 47–48.
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show that they considered its effect on the general body of creditors. Detri-
ment or benefit should not be based, though, on whether or not a move was in
fact successful or on whether it was affected with the approval of all the
creditors. The directors’ duties regime, if adopted in national laws, also has
the potential to address more effectively situations of wrongful forum shop-
ping, compared with cross-border insolvency models, which necessitate swift
decisions regarding the opening and recognition of insolvency proceedings.
Cross-border insolvency regimes would operate more smoothly if they focus
on determining the location of the company’s centre while further enquiries
regarding the circumstances surrounding relocation would be addressed in the
context of directors’ duties litigation.
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